Fiscal federalism in big developing countries: China and India by Fraschini, Angela
 
Dipartimento di Politiche Pubbliche e Scelte Collettive – POLIS 





















Fiscal federalism in big developing 





















UNIVERSITA’ DEL PIEMONTE ORIENTALE “Amedeo Avogadro”  ALESSANDRIA 








University of Eastern Piedmont - Italy 
 
Abstract 
In South and East Asian countries a highly centralized government prevails, although recently some trends are moving 
toward a greater degree of decentralization. Also the two giants China and India, which cannot rely on a merely 
centralized Government,  have experienced a greater or lesser degree of fiscal unionism. As to China the local 
government system provides four levels: provincial level; city level; county level; township level. Intergovernmental 
fiscal relations were revamped by the 1994 reform that established a new tax sharing system and gave local 
governments more control over the administration of local taxes but no significant degree of tax autonomy and no 
substantial expenditure assignments. The local financial revenue mainly derives from local taxes, shared taxes, and non-
tax revenue. As to India, the federal system is quite complex. The center-states relations are envisaged in the 
Constitution also for the financial aspects: two constitutional amendments adopted in 1992 made India one of the most 
politically decentralized countries among developing ones. However, the implementation of the decentralization 
program is still lagging: till now India seems to have considered decentralization mainly in terms of the local election 
system, without the transfer of all functions provided for devolution to local bodies. Only India set up a different system 
of local bodies in rural and urban areas with different expenditure responsibilities and financing powers. On the 
contrary, China has a unitary fiscal system. In India it is necessary to redesign the transfer system to improve 
accountability, incentives and equity, whereas in China, the fiscal revenue sharing schemes limit intergovernmental 
budget transfers. Finally, the rule of hard budget constraint in China is faced by all levels of government, while in India 
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 1. Introduction 
 
China and India are the two biggest developing countries in South-East Asia. Although 
different as to their historical, institutional and cultural developments, these enormous countries 
cannot rely on a merely centralized Government, due to the extension and the striking existing 
differences among their regions, more than once populated by some hundred million people. 
Therefore, both the countries share a greater or lesser degree of fiscal federalism or, better, of fiscal 
unionism. We compare the different institutional arrangements of fiscal decentralization in China 
and in India, focusing on the financing (own resources, share to central taxes, grants, equalization 
systems) of sub-national layers. The two countries have different typology of decentralization. As to 
China the local government system provides four levels: provincial level, which is the highest local 
level and includes provincial, autonomous regions and municipal governments; city level, which 
includes cities under the jurisdiction of the provinces, autonomous prefectures and districts under 
the jurisdiction of municipal governments; county level, which includes autonomous counties, 
counties and towns; township level, which is the lowest level and includes towns and villages. 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations were revamped by the 1994 reform that established a new tax 
sharing system that fundamentally changed the apportionment of tax revenue between the central 
and provincial governments. The local financial revenue mainly derives from local taxes (such as 
business tax, personal income tax, tax on the use of urban land, tax on real estates, tax on 
agriculture and special agriculture products, etc.), shared taxes (value added tax, stamp tax and tax 
on resources other than the ocean petroleum resources) and non-tax revenue (fees, penalties, 
subsidies, other income, etc.). Notwithstanding the reforms, the fiscal system is still unitary. 
Nevertheless, local government is increasingly playing a part in local economic development and 
some local governments are beginning to exercise influence on central government. As to India, the 
federal system is quite complex, as a consequence of regional disparities and of both vertical and 
horizontal fiscal imbalances. The center-states relations are envisaged in the Constitution also for 
the financial aspects and the assignment of tax power is based on the principle of separation. Local 
governments have different institutional arrangements in rural and urban area, in accordance with 
the two 1992 constitutional amendments that made India one of the most politically decentralized 
countries among developing ones. However, in practice the implementation of the decentralization 
program is still lagging, especially in rural areas. Major taxes levied by urban local bodies, which 
have greater tax power than the rural ones, are tax on property including service levy for water 
supply, conservancy, drainage, lighting and garbage disposal; tax on entry of goods into a local area 
for consumption use of sale therein, known as octroi; tax on professions; tax on vehicles (other than 
motor vehicles).  
  1Finally, in the last section we conclude by comparing fiscal federalism arrangements 
prevailing in these so big and still developing countries with the rules that should be followed to 
implement fiscal decentralization.  
 
 
2. A short synopsis of administrative divisions and taxes by level of government 
 
  Shortly speaking, the governmental systems that characterize the two countries are quite different: 
China is a communist state that is increasingly opening to areas of free-market, India is a federal 
democratic republic. Nevertheless, the countries have different levels of government and 




3. China and India: a comparison 
 
China and India are the world’s two largest nations
1 and, from an historical point of view, there are 
a number of similarities between the two countries: ancient civilizations that were, at one time, the 
richest in the world, declining in the second half of the second millennium and starting their way to 
modernity in the middle of the last century. Moreover, many general similarities existed between 
the economies of China and India at the time the Communists assumed power in China in 1949 and 
India achieved its independence in 1947. Until the 1980s of the last century the economic 
performance of China and India was not much different (also per capita GDP was similar) and both 
the countries experienced economic reforms that led to a growth’s acceleration. In particular, during 
the period 1952-80 the two countries grew at about the same GDP rate because the slow growth of 
the Chinese agriculture and service sectors smoothed its fast growing industrial sector.  
Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, in 1980 China initiated economic reforms, a decade 
earlier than India, and as a consequence its economy grew at double the rate of growth of India 
during the 1980s and the early 1990s. Thus since few years there is a growing gap between the 
performance of the two giant countries and in 2003 the per capita GDP
2 was estimated to be $ 5,000 
in China and $ 2,900 in India (see CIA, The World Factbook). This result is not only imputable to a 
                                                 
1 According to the estimated  data of The World Factbook, on July 2004 the population of China was around 1,299 
million and that of India was around 1,065 million.  
2 GDP on a purchasing power parity basis divided by population as of 1 July for the same year. 
  2faster GDP growth, but also to a lower population increase, thanks to the one-child policy 
implemented in China. For a short comparison of selected items see Table 2. 
       
Moreover, the two countries have a different government type though both have a multi-level 
government. China is a “socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working 
class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants”  (art. 1 of the Chinese Constitution). 
According to article 30 of the Chinese Constitution, the administrative division of the People's 
Republic of China is as follows: a) the country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and 
municipalities directly under the central government (these latter and other large cities are divided 
into districts and counties); b) provinces and autonomous regions are divided into autonomous 
prefectures,
3 counties, autonomous counties and cities; c) counties and autonomous counties are 
divided into townships, nationality townships, and towns. The state may establish special 
administrative regions when necessary. As shown in Table 1, currently China has 23 provinces 
(considering Taiwan the 23rd), five autonomous regions and four municipalities, while Macau and 
Hong Kong are special administrative regions.
4 Then the modern Chinese system
5 includes a share 
of authority between the central and local governments, providing a partial basis for a special kind 
of federalism called “market-preserving federalism”
6 (Weingast 1995).  
As regards India, we have already noted that it is a federal republic and its government 
consists of a central (union) government, 28 state governments and 7 union territories. Many states 
have autonomous regions with regional councils and in different states there are three tiers of local 
bodies. There also are 602 districts administered by their respective state/UT government.  
In the following sub-sections we briefly outline the main features of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in both the countries.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Autonomous prefectures are divided into counties, autonomous counties, and cities 
4 The special administrative region is the product of the conception of “one country, two systems,” which means that the Mainland of 
China carries out a socialist system and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan a capitalist system. But in international affairs, the People’s 
Republic of China is the only country representing China. 
5 Currently the government structure in China is the following: the People’s Congress is the supreme organ of state 
power and its permanent organization is the Standing Committee that exercises legislative power. The local People’s 
Congresses at different levels are the state power organs at local level. The State Council is the supreme administrative 
organ of the state and the executive organ of the supreme organ of state power. People’s Courts at different levels are 
the judicial organs. The People’s Courts at local levels, Special People’s Courts and Supreme People’s Courts exercise 
judicial authority. The Supreme, Local and Special People’s Protectorates at local levels are the organs of law 
supervision of the state. Local governments are the administrative organs of state under leadership the State Council and 
are divided in autonomous governments of nationality regions and governments of special administrative regions. The 
organizational system of local government is divided into provincial, city, county and village level (Unescap b, n.d.). 
6 It has been noticed that, to the extent that federalism has played a helpful role in promoting China’s economic growth, 
the competitive benefits of “market-preserving federalism” depends very much on political centralization (Blanchard 
and Shleifer 2000). 
 
  33.1 Intergovernmental fiscal relations in China 
 
China has a five-tiered administrative structure: apart from the central government, there are 31 
provincial level units (22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities directly under the 
central government); 331 prefectures and municipalities at the prefectural level; 2,109 counties, 
autonomous counties and cities at the county level; 44,741 townships, towns and city districts. 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations have undergone substantial changes in the last twenty-five 
years (Bahl and Wallich 1992; Arora and Norregaard 1997; World Bank 2002). Until the beginning 
of the reform era and as a consequence of central planning (extending approximately from 1957 to 
1979) public finances in China were rather centralized in that all taxes and profits accrued to the 
central government, which then transferred to local governments the funds they needed to meet the 
spending priorities set by the central government itself. Local governments were responsible for 
collecting all taxes - acting simply as agents of the center - and their spending autonomy was 
restricted to minor amounts covered with extra-budgetary funds. A revenue sharing mechanism was 
introduced in 1980, partly with a view to providing local governments with incentives to improve 
tax collection. To this end revenues from each tax were classified as “central fixed revenue”, “local 
fixed revenue” or “shared revenue” (the shares were determined through negotiations between the 
central and provincial governments). It should be noted that this arrangement only involved the 
center and the provinces, which were left free to decide on revenue assignments at lower levels as 
they pleased, in line with the nature of the system as a “nested hierarchy”. To enable poorer 
provinces to cope with their expenditure needs, the system was revised in 1985 so that provinces 
where local fixed revenue exceeded local expenditures were required to remit part of that revenue to 
the center, while provinces where local expenditures could not be covered by local fixed revenue 
were granted a higher proportion of shared revenue or, in the event that even all of it was 
insufficient to break even, were given a transfer from the central government. A final change before 
the 1994 reform was made in 1988 with the establishment of the so-called “fiscal contracting 
system” (also known as the “fiscal responsibility system”), under which provincial governments 
agreed to transfer a fixed tax quota (i.e. a lump-sum remittance or subsidy, to increase annually at a 
single-digit rate) to the central government, while retaining every revenue in excess of it. The 
different terms of the revenue-sharing contracts negotiated by each province resulted in growing 
disparities among provinces and increased the elements of bargaining present in intergovernmental 
relations. In the words of Ahmad, Li and Richardson (2002) “the new system also created a strong 
incentive for local governments to conceal information about local revenue from the center, else 
they would face a “ratchet effect,” as this information would be valuable at the time the fiscal 
contracts were renegotiated. Furthermore, many of the new enterprises in the rapidly expanding 
  4township and village enterprise sector were joint ventures with local government ownership. With 
retained profits accruing to the benefit of “local shareholders”, there was a continued incentive to 
shift deficits to the center and hide profits from taxation.” 
One of the main objectives of the 1994 reform was therefore to revamp intergovernmental 
fiscal relations. Consequently a new tax sharing system (TSS) was established which fundamentally 
changed the apportionment of tax revenue between the central and provincial governments. Taxes 
were classified into three categories: central fixed taxes, local fixed taxes and shared taxes. Tax 
revenues assigned to the central government included mainly those from: customs duties, VAT and 
excise taxes on imports; consumption tax; income tax on all centrally owned state enterprises; taxes 
collected from the Ministry of Railroads and from the headquarters of banks and insurance 
companies; income tax, turnover taxes and resource tax from offshore oil activities; enterprise 
income tax collected from banks and other financial institutions. Local governments were assigned 
revenues from: personal income tax; income tax on locally owned state enterprises, collectives and 
private firms; urban and rural land use tax; farmland occupation tax; land appreciation tax; house 
property tax; urban real estate tax; vehicle and vessel use tax; deed tax; agricultural and animal 
husbandry taxes; slaughter tax; entertainment and banquet taxes. Shared taxes included: VAT (75 
percent central, 25 percent provincial); the securities exchange tax (88 percent of the revenues from 
stock transactions to the central government; all the rest to provincial governments); the natural 
resource tax (almost entirely local). To implement the new revenue assignment the tax 
administration was split: the bureaus of the State Administration of Taxation were charged with 
collecting all central and shared taxes, while local taxes were left to the responsibility of local tax 
bureaus. Despite the introduction of the TSS provincial governments were not given any significant 
degree of tax autonomy, since they can only set the rates of a few minor taxes, while every other 
revenue decision is to be taken at Beijing. 
The reform of intergovernmental relations was completed by redesigning the system of 
transfers, with a view to introducing a more rule-based mechanism. Now there are four types of 
grants in China: the “fixed subsidies under the old system” serve to provide local governments with 
the same (nominal) level of revenue as in 1993;
7 the “revenue returned” is intended to allow 
provinces to share in the increase in the revenue from VAT and consumption tax; the “specific-
purpose grants” (or earmarked transfers) are administered by individual ministries and have a 
regulatory function, forcing local governments (which are also required to match the grants received 
with local funds) to comply with policy priorities set by the center; finally, the “transitional 
transfers”, introduced on a pilot basis in 1995, are designed to equalize fiscal resources across 
                                                 
7 It should be added that “fixed subsidies under the old system” include also transfers from local governments to the 
center.  
  5provinces. In view of the unique redistributive purpose of the latter, we look at them in more detail. 
The formula for computing the amount to be transferred to each province is made out of three 
components: the first one, objective in nature, is intended to measure the gap between “standard 
expenditures” and local fiscal capacity; the second one has policy motivations, tending to favor 
regions with large ethnic minority population; and the third one, added in 1996, should reward 
provincial tax effort (World Bank 2002). 
The respective weights of each of these types of transfers in the five-year period 1997–2001 
are shown in Table 3. 
Fixed subsidies are a minor component of total transfers and their share halved from almost 4 
percent in 1997 to 2 percent in 2001. Earmarked transfers amounted to more than one third of total 
transfers in 2001 and they have nearly doubled in relative terms during the period involved; their 
increasing importance is the result of the proactive regional policy of the central government in 
recent years and of the necessity to respond to particular emergencies (the Asian financial crisis, the 
inadequacy of resources for local spending on social protection, the rise in pension benefits), 
however, in the absence of effective monitoring mechanisms to control how these funds are really 
used, they may be diverted by local governments to their own priorities. Transfers based on the 
“revenue returned” mechanism, though continuously declining, still represented almost 40 percent 
of total transfers in 2001 and, in view of the regressive nature of the formula for determining their 
amount (which favors the wealthier coastal provinces), their predominance is an enduring obstacle 
to the equalization of fiscal resources. Finally, general-purpose grants (a composite item including 
the transitional period transfers) more than tripled their share in total transfers (from 7.5 percent in 
1997 to 24.5 percent in 2001). However, during the transitional period, transfers are still a minor 
component, by accounting for around one tenth of the total in 2000. 
An insight into the equalization properties of the actual transfer system in China is given by 
the simulations presented in Ahmad, Singh and Fortuna (2004). First of all, the authors calculate 
expenditure needs for each province based on 2000 data: they group expenditures into seven 
categories, determine the share of each in total expenditure and apply specific weights for each 
category that should reflect factors likely to affect public services’ costs in each province (total 
population, degree of urbanization, presence of ethnic minorities, age structure of population). They 
construct then an indirect measure of each province’s “revenue capacity”: to this end they use each 
province’s GDP as a proxy of the tax base of the province and multiply it by a coefficient obtained 
by regressing provinces’ own revenue (i.e. revenue before transfers) against their GDP
8. The next 
step is subtracting the standard expenditure needs of each province from its revenue capacity to get 
                                                 
8 As for expenditures, data refer to year 2000. 
  6the shortfall or excess of resources of each province. Finally, the authors consider three scenarios: 
in the first one, the amount of total transfers from the central government to provinces in 2000 is 
used for equalization purposes (provinces with a positive balance get nothing, while provinces with 
a “deficit” receive a grant proportional to their shortfall) and every other type of transfer is 
cancelled; in the other two scenarios, equalization is carried out only partially (absorbing 
respectively only 20 percent and 60 percent of total transfers), while the remaining amount is 
attributed to provinces according to the transfer pattern in 2000. By regressing per capita transfers 
against per capita GDP in each province, the authors find that the actual system has no equalizing 
effect, which is absent or insignificant also in the two hypotheses of partial equalization, while a 
positive and significant equalizing effect is present only in the first scenario. 
 
 
3.2 Intergovernmental fiscal relations in India 
 
As we have already noticed, India has a federal structure with peculiar features. The two essential 
features of Indian federalism are: a) federalism is not the result of an agreement by the units; b) the 
component units have no freedom to secede
9. Historical factors, mainly the colonial system, have 
played a strong role in making the Indian federal system quite centralized. Indian Constitution 
makers divided the government functions in three lists: federal, state and concurrent. Under the 
Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution, the central government has exclusive powers on 
foreign policy, defence, communications, currency, taxation on corporations and non-agricultural 
income, and railroads; while state governments have the exclusive power to legislate on such 
subjects as law and order, public health and sanitation, local government, betting and gambling, and 
taxation on agricultural income, entertainment, and alcoholic beverages. On some issues both the 
central government and state governments may legislate, though a union law generally dominates 
states’ ones. Among these areas are criminal law, marriage and divorce, contracts, economic and 
social planning, population control and family planning, trade unions, social security, and 
education. All residuary issues lie within the exclusive domain of the central government. An 
important power of the central government is that of creating new states, by combining states, 
changing their boundaries, and terminating a state’s existence. The central government may also 
create and dissolve any of the union territories, which have more limited powers than those of the 
states. Although the states exercise either exclusive or joint control over a substantial range of 
issues, the Constitution establishes a more dominant role for the union government. 
                                                 
9 For a brief description of the evolution of financial relations from 1858 up to the coming into force of the Constitution 
in 1950 see Vithal and Sastry, 2001. 
  7The assignment of tax power is based on the principle of separation; most broad based taxes 
are assigned to the centre, whereas in practice the states have a narrower tax base
10 and the 
consequence is a vertical fiscal imbalance. In 2002-03 the states, on average, raised about 38 
percent of central revenues, but incurred about 58 percent of expenditures. The capacity of the 
states to finance their current expenditures from their own sources of revenues has declined from 69 
percent in 1955-56 to 52 percent in 2002-03. Transfers from the centre made up the balance (Singh 
2004).  
The inadequacy of the states to meet expenditures from their own resources is recognized by 
the Constitution of India (Articles 275 and 282) that provides principles for the sharing of resources 
between the centre and the states, without specifying the revenue shares but providing for a Finance 
Commission, which is appointed by the President of India every five years or earlier if needed.
11 In 
other words, the Finance Commission is the body provided by the Constitution to regulate the flow 
of transfers from the central government to the states and their allocation among different states.  
Generally, the Finance Commission makes recommendations on the following matters:  
i) the distribution between the union and the states of the net proceeds of taxes that are to be 
divided between them under Chapter I Part XII of the Constitution
12 and the allocation among the 
states of the respective shares of such proceeds;
13  
ii) the principles that should govern the grants-in-aid of the revenues of the states out of the 
consolidated Fund of India
14 and the sums to be paid to the states which are in need of assistance 
by way of grants-in-aid of their revenues under article 275 of the Constitution;
15  
                                                 
10 See country chapter.  
11 The last Finance Commission appointed is the twelfth and its report must cover a period of five years commencing on 
the 1
st April 2005. 
12 Before the Eightieth Amendment Act, 2000, the Constitution provided for sharing of two taxes, income tax and union 
excise duties, with the states. The relevant ratios determining the vertical allocation in tax devolution have remained for 
many years at 85 percent in the case of income tax and at 45 percent for union excise duties. The Tenth Finance 
Commission proposed a system of vertical resource sharing in which central taxes are pooled and a proportion of 29 
percent of gross proceeds devolved to the states (26 percent to all states and three percent to those where sales tax on 
sugar, textiles and tobacco was not levied). That recommendation brought forth an amendment to the Constitution 
(Eightieth Amendment Act 2000). The Eleventh Finance Commission recommended the devolution of 29.5 percent (28 
percent to all states and 1.5 percent to those which did not levy sales tax on sugar, textile and tobacco) of net proceeds 
of all shareable taxes. (Government of India 2000). About 20 per cent of the revenue collected by the union is 
transferred under tax sharing mechanism (Chaubey 2003). 
13 For example, the Eighth and Ninth Commissions determined the respective shares of states in the devolution of 
income tax and union excise duties on the basis of three allocating criteria: a) population; b) distance (measured by the 
term (yn  - yi) where yn is the highest per capita income among all the states); c) inverse of income.  
14 The consolidate Fund of India is a part of the government accounts in which are credited all revenues received by 
government by way of taxation and other receipts flowing to government in connection with the conduct of government 
business, like receipts from railways, posts, transport etc. (non-tax revenues). Similarly, all loans raised by government 
by issue of public notifications, internal and external debt and all moneys received by government in repayment of loans 
and interest thereon is also credited into this fund. All expenditure incurred by the government for the conduct of its 
business including repayment of internal and external debt and release of loans to states/union territory governments for 
various purposes is debited against this fund. 
  8iii) the measures needed to augment the consolidated Fund of a state to supplement the 
resources of the panchayats and municipalities in the state on the basis of the recommendations 
made by the Finance Commission of the state.
16  
Moreover, the Commission reviews the financial situation of the union and the states and 
suggests a plan by which the governments, collectively and severally, may bring about a 
restructuring of the public finances to restore budgetary balance and to achieve macro-economic 
stability and debt reduction along with equitable growth. 
Over the last fifty years the Finance Commissions have elaborated a sophisticated methodology 
to deal with horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances. To distribute horizontally the major taxes that 
are shared between the centre and the states
17 the Finance Commissions used a large number of 
criteria, among which: population, tax effort, collection assessment, income distance, income 
adjusted total population, indices of social and economic backwardness, territorial area, post-
devolution deficits, poverty, revenue equalization, etc. (Singh 2003). The Eleventh Finance 
Commission (2000-2005) set a new benchmark in the centre-state fiscal relations: it reduced weight 
of population from 20-30 percent in the recent past to 10 percent, maintained weight of income 
distance criterion at 62.5 percent and chose to allocate the remaining percent of states’ share of 
pooled proceeds according to area (7.5), infrastructure (7.5), tax effort (5.0) and fiscal discipline 
(7.5). 
Besides the devolution of share in central taxes and duties, the central government gives the 
states grants-in-aid
18 to cover their revenue deficit
19. In addition, specific grants to states are 
provided for their special problems and for upgrading administration’s standards in a number of 
sectors.
20 Grants for local bodies are also provided.
21 
                                                                                                                                                                  
15 For example, the Eleventh Finance Commission suggested giving grants-in-aid to the states equal to the amount of 
the deficits as estimated for each of the years during 1995-96 to 1999-2000. Under this head only 3-4 percent of the 
total revenue receipts of the union are transferred (Chaubey 2003). 
16  For a brief description of the main recommendations with respect to local government see, for example, Rao and 
Sing, 2004. 
17 Under Article 270 of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (Eightieth Amendment) Act, 2000, a prescribed 
percentage of the net proceeds of all central taxes and duties (except union surcharge, cess levied for specific purposes 
and the duties and taxes referred to in article 268 and 269 – that is stamp duties, duties of excise on medicinal and toilet 
preparations, taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers and taxes on the consignment of goods, where 
such sale, purchase or consignment take place in the course of inter-state trade or commerce) is to be assigned to the 
states within which that tax or duty can be levied in that year and distributed among those states in terms of the 
recommendations of the Finance Commission.. The 11
th  Finance Commission recommended that 29.5% of the net 
proceeds of  central taxes/duties may be distributed amongst all such states where the central tax/duty can be levied. 
18 Grants-in-aid under Article 275 of the Constitution are need-based, on the recommendations of the Finance 
Commission, while grants under Article 282 are purpose-based, in the sense that the central government has the power 
to make discretionary grants to the states. 
19 For example, the 11
th Finance Commission recommended grants-in-aid amounting to Rs.35359.07 crores to 15 states 
equal to the amount of deficits assessed for each year during the period 2000-05. 
20 For example, the 11
th Finance Commission recommended grants for the period 2000-05 amounting to Rs.3843.63 
crores to all the states for upgrading of standards of administration for the following sectors: district administration; 
  9Moreover, the central government distributes substantial grants to the states through its 
development plans as elaborated by the Planning Commission
22. While the Finance Commission 
decides on tax shares and makes grants-in-aid, the Planning Commission allocates resources in 
accordance with the foreseen priorities, making grants and loans to implement development plans. It 
is worth to notice the problem of coordination between the two independent commissions that arises. 
The loan-grant composition of the assistance given to special category states is 10:90 while that to 
other states is 70:30 (the amount allocated to any recipient state include grant and loan in the above 
proportion, and the state cannot accept the grant without accepting the loan). Before 1969, plan 
transfers were project-based; since then, the distribution has been done on the basis of a formula that 
takes into account population, per capita income, fiscal performance (tax effort, fiscal management, 
national objectives) and special problems (Singh, 2004 and Ma, 1997). Plan revenue grants make 
about 7-8 percent of the total revenue receipts of the union (Chaubey, 2003).  
Summing up, the Indian intergovernmental transfer system consists of three elements: a) a 
general purpose grants mechanism, based on a revenue-sharing scheme (at present general tax 
sharing), operated by the Finance Commission to assist the backward areas (equalization transfers, 
formula-based); b) a formula-based unconditional transfers and specific purpose transfers operated 
by the Planning Commission to implement development plans; c) specific purpose transfers with or 
without matching requirements.  
This system of inter-governmental fiscal relations, characterized by transfer dependence and 
soft budget constraint, has created adverse incentives for prudent fiscal behaviour by the state sector. 
A recent study (Purfield 2004) confirms that transfer dependency, coupled with bailouts 
expectations, contributes to the growth in states’ deficits. And, it is worth to note, high fiscal deficit 
of the states represents an important obstacle to the fiscal decentralization process begun in the ‘90s. 
This process have been forced by economic and political events, such as liberalization and 
globalisation in one hand, and the end of single party rule, with the emergence of coalition parties in 
power at the centre and the increasing importance of regional parties in the political affairs of the 
country, on the other hand (Rao 2004). 
                                                                                                                                                                  
police administration; prisons administration; fire services; judicial administration; fiscal administration; health 
services; elementary education; computer training for school children; public libraries; heritage protection; 
augmentation of traditional water sources. 
21 For example, the 11
th Finance Commission recommended grants totalling to Rs.10,000 crore for local bodies during 
2000-05, to be utilised (except the amount earmarked for maintenance of accounts & audit - Rs. 493.04 crore - and for 
development of database – Rs: 200 crore) for maintenance of civic services in rural and urban areas. The annual grant 
recommended was Rs.1600 crore for rural local bodies and Rs.400 crore for urban local bodies. 
22 The Planning Commission was not conceived in the Constitution but through a resolution of the cabinet, after 50 days 
of promulgation of the Constitution. 
  10At present there are two types of local governments: urban local governments and rural local 
governments. In fact, in 1992 to bring to effect the process of decentralization - that is, the transfer 
of administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities to locally elected bodies
23 - the government of 
India introduced two Constitutional Amendments: the Seventy-Third, for rural decentralization, and 
the Seventy-Fourth, for urban decentralization. These amendments, which established the political 
decentralization, leaving the implementation of administrative and fiscal aspects to the states, 
provided for a uniform structure of Nagar Panchayats
24 for areas in transition from a rural area to 
an urban area, municipal councils for smaller urban areas and municipal corporations for larger 
urban areas.
25 Rural local governments operate through district (Zilla) Panchayats, intermediate
26 
(Taluka) Panchayats and village (Gram) Panchayats
27 (see Table 4). Moreover, the amendments 
granted local self-governments a constitutional status and safeguarded their continued existence.  
Rules and institutions are different between the two types of local governments and 
generally the fiscal power is higher for urban than for rural governments, as shown in Table 5.  
As it is recognized, an important indicator of fiscal autonomy is the share of the revenue 
expenditure covered with own resources and also the percentage of own resources on total 
resources. This is necessary to know how much autonomous or dependent local bodies are on 
external sources. Table 5 shows that the percent share of own resources in total revenue of the rural 
local bodies was only 6.72 in 1998-99, declining to 5.99 in 1999-2000 and increasing in the 
                                                 
23 In India, locally elected bodies are the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) (at the district, intermediate and village 
levels) and the urban local bodies at all levels. 
24 Panchayat means an institution of self-government constituted under article 243B of the Constitution. It is worth to 
observe that what is referred to as local self-government is in actual fact a circumscribed space where there is no 
legislative and judicial authority and where the issues on which citizens can make decisions is limited ( De Souza, 
2000). 
25 For the urban local bodies the 74
th Amendment provides for “…g) the devolution by the State Legislature of powers 
and responsibilities upon the Municipalities with respect to preparation of plans  for economic development and social 
justice, and for the implementation of development schemes as may be required to enable them to function as 
institutions of self-government; h) levy of taxes and duties by Municipalities, assigning of such taxes and duties to 
Municipalities by State Governments and for making grants-in-aid by the State to the Municipalities as may be provided 
in the State law.” 
26 Intermediate level means a level between the village and district levels. 
27 For the rural local governments the 73
rd Amendment states that “… subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the 
Legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority as may be necessary to 
enable them to function as institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of 
powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified 
therein, with respect to : a) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice; b) the 
implementation of. schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in 
relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule. The Legislature of a State may, by law, a) authorise a Panchayat 
to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to such 
limits; b) assign to a Panchayat such taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied and collected by the State Government for such 
purposes and subject to such conditions and limits; c) provide for making such grants-in-aid to the Panchayats from the 
Consolidated Fund of the State; and d) Provide for constitution of such funds for crediting all moneys received, 
respectively, by or on behalf of the Panchayats and also for the withdrawal of such moneys there from as may be 
specified in the law”. 
  11following years, reaching 6.85 in 2002-2003. This implies that more than 93 percent of their total 
revenues were derived from external sources. On the other hand, the urban local bodies raised 59.69 
percent of their total revenues from own resources in 1998-99 but this percentage declined to 58.44 
in 2002-02. Also the percentage of revenue expenditure covered by own resources is very different 
for rural and urban local bodies (9.26 percent and 68.97 percent, respectively, in 2002-03). 
Again, the percentage of revenue derived from own taxes is much lower for rural local 
bodies than for urban local bodies (3.87 percent against 39.23 percent in 2002-2003). At present the 
revenue of the rural local bodies is principally constituted by grants and the dependence upon the 
state government even for carrying out the routine functions is quite heavy. Among the three-tiers 
of panchayats, the Gram panchayats are comparatively in a better position because they have some 
taxing power of their own, while the other two tiers are dependent only on tolls, fees and non-tax 
revenue for generating internal resources. Relative to the municipalities, even after the 74
th 
Amendment, the Constitution does not provide to them for an autonomous domain of tax raising 
power, which continues to be decided and regulated by the state governments that specify the taxes 
(taken from the state list in the Seventh Schedule
28) that the municipalities can levy and collect. 
Historically these taxes have comprised taxes on lands and buildings, on entry of goods into a local 
area for consumption, on animals and boats, on entertainment, on professions, trades, etc. There is 
an important variability among the states, but a uniform feature is represented by the significant 
control of the state governments in determining the tax, tax rates or even tax exemptions, since there 
is no distinct tax domain of the municipalities as such. Therefore, as recommended by the National 
Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (“Venkatachaliah Commission”), a distinct 
and separate tax domain for municipalities should be recognized (Government of India, Ministry of 
Law 2002). 
Local government bodies are covered in the state list
29 and are governed by the state statutes 
or, in the case of union territories, by the union parliament. Notwithstanding the above quoted 
                                                 
28 The items included in the 7
th Schedule under the state list are the following: 1) taxes on agricultural income; 2) duties 
in respect of succession to agricultural land; 3) estate duty in respect of agricultural land; 4) taxes on lands and 
buildings; 5) taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral 
development; 6) duties of excise on the following goods manufactured or produced in the State and countervailing 
duties at the same or lower rates on similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in India: (a) alcoholic liquors for 
human consumption; (b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics, but not including medicinal and 
toilet preparations containing alcohol; 7) taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale 
therein; 8) taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity; 9) taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than 
newspapers; 10) taxes on advertisements other than advertisements published in the newspapers [and advertisements 
broadcast by radio or television]; 11) taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways; 12) taxes 
on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use on roads, including tramcars; 13) taxes on animals 
and boats; 14) tolls; 15) taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments; 16) capitation taxes; 17) taxes on 
luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling. 
29 Recently, there has been a proposal to create of a separate “local list” for the local bodies, so redesigning the present 
central and state jurisdictions (see Government of India, Ministry of Law 2002). 
  12amendments to the Constitution that made India one of the most politically decentralized countries 
among developing ones, in practice the implementation of the decentralization program is still 
lagging, specially in rural areas. In fact, while political decentralization has progressed satisfactorily 
- states modified their acts consistently with the requirements of the amendments, and most of them 
have carried out local elections -, administrative and fiscal decentralization are taking place at a 
much more hesitant pace, also owing to the reluctance of some state governments to share their 
fiscal powers with the local self-government institutions. As in every decentralized system, in India 
local bodies represent the nearest government to the people, charged with the responsibility of 
providing most of the basic services. The core services that would be granted by local bodies are 
identified as primary education, primary health, rural or municipal roads, drinking water supply, 
sanitation, and street- lighting. But few states have vested the local bodies with the necessary 
powers, funds and staff to enable them to perform the functions assigned to them under the statutes. 
It is obvious that the three “F” (functions, functionaries and finances) have to go together for any 
process of devolution to be meaningful. Therefore it is clear that the failure to assign human 
resources affects the growth of panchayats and municipalities as self-governing institutions. As 
made evident by the Venkatachaliah Commission, “in the process of implementation of the 73
rd and 
74
th Amendments, considerable gaps have been noticed. The Union Government and the State 
Governments continue to exercise powers in planning and the Panchayats and Municipalities do 
not enjoy autonomy - financial or administrative - as institutions of local self-government. While 
today Panchayats elect some three million members of whom one-third are women, the objectives 
envisaged in the Amendments have not been fully achieved (…) Even in the States which have 
shown political will to decentralize, devolution has not gone beyond entrusting to them 
responsibility for implementation of the schemes/projects conceived by the State or Union 
government. As a result, Panchayats have not blossomed into institutions of self-government. 
Instead they have been reduced to an implementing arm of the State Government ” (Government of 
India, Ministry of Law 2002). 
In several states all functions provided for devolution to local bodies, as envisaged in the 
constitutional amendments, have not been transferred. For example, out of 29 subjects, the 
government of Andhra Pradesh has transferred only 17 to rural local bodies and most of these 
transfers are partial, without the transfer of funds and functionaries. Functions like primary 
education, primary health care, drinking water supply, have not been devolved to local bodies in 
rural areas but are being looked after and operated by the line departments of the state government 
or by special boards/agencies. In many cases, even when a function is transferred to local bodies, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
  13the state governments do not vacate their operations from such areas, with the result that all local 
functions, in effect, have become concurrent. In other words, most of the states, despite transferring 
a number of functions, have not minded to give up their involvement in such matters and continue 
to maintain big staff at the state and district headquarters.  Moreover, there is no specific 
accountability, in the sense that the role of three tiers of local bodies has not been clearly defined in 
the state legislations. In fact, very few states have translated all the subjects into activities and 
specific functions for three tiers of local bodies. Most states have listed all the functions as equally 
relevant for all the three tiers of local bodies. It is evident that in doing so there is a breach of the 
principle of subsidiarity, which establishes, as well known, that whatever can be done at one level 
should be done at that level and not at a higher one. In addition, in some states only Gram 
panchayats have been entrusted with all the functions included in Eleventh Schedule,
30 while the 
intermediate level and the district level panchayats have not been assigned any taxation powers and 
any functions except the supervisory ones (Mishra n.d). Another important function assigned to 
local bodies under the constitutional provisions is that of planning for economic and social 
development in their respective areas, but this function is not being performed in most of the states. 
This can be considered a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, though it is difficult to imagine 
an active role of local governments as to this function in a country where the deprivation is endemic 
and regional disparities are growing (on regional disparities see, for example, Buddhadeb and Prabir 
2005).  
In many states one of the main reasons of the limited devolution of functions and fiscal 
decision-making power is commonly imputed to the lack of reliable information on the spending 
and the revenue of the local bodies
31 that prevents the centre and the states from implementing a 
                                                 
30 The functions included in the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution are the following: 1. Agriculture, including 
agricultural extension; 2. Land improvement, implementation of land reforms, land consolidation and soil conservation; 
3. Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development; 4. Animal husbandry, dairying and poultry; 5. 
Fisheries; 6. Social forestry and farm forestry; 7. Minor forest produce; 8. Small scale industries, including food 
processing industries; 9. Khadi, village and cottage industries; 10. Rural housing; 11. Drinking water; 12. Fuel and 
fodder; 13. Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and other means of communication; 14. Rural electrification, 
including distribution of electricity; 15. Non-conventional energy sources; 16. Poverty alleviation programs; 17. 
Education, including primary and secondary schools; 18. Technical training and vocational education; 19. Adult and 
non-formal education; 20. Libraries; 21. Cultural activities; 22. Markets and fairs; 23. Health and sanitation, including 
hospitals, primary health centres and dispensaries; 24. Family welfare; 25. Women and child development; 26. Social 
welfare, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally retarded; 27. Welfare of the weaker sections, and in 
particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes; 28. Public distribution system; 29. Maintenance of 
community assets.  
 
31 “In many States, the formats and procedures for maintenance of accounts by these bodies prescribed decades ago, 
are continued without making any improvements to take into account the manifold increase in their powers, resources 
and responsibilities. Most village level panchayats do not have any staff except for a full or a part-time secretary, 
because of financial constraints.(…) There is no mechanism for collection of data on the revenue and expenditure of the 
  14serious empowerment of local governments. Moreover, the lack of accountability of local bodies, 
because of inadequate provisions in law relating to audit of accounts, does not support 
decentralization. In addition, the high fiscal deficit of the states represents an important obstacle to 
the fiscal decentralization process (World Bank 2004).  
To achieve the constitutional goal of making local bodies as units of self-governance the 
Eleventh and the Twelfth Finance Commissions have had the mandate in their terms of reference to 
recommend measures needed to augment the consolidated Fund of the states to supplement the 
resources of local bodies. In the view of the Eleventh Finance Commission, the states may take the 
following measures for augmenting their consolidated Funds to supplement the resources of 
panchayats and municipalities: 
i)  land taxes: taxes on land/farm income in some form may be levied to strengthen the 
resource base of the local bodies. The amounts so collected may be passed on to the local bodies for 
improving and strengthening the civic services. Local bodies may also be involved in collection of 
these taxes; 
ii) surcharge/cess on state taxes: “cess” on land based taxes and other state taxes/duties may 
be levied to mobilize resources for augmenting specific civic services and for improving their 
quality. For example, a “cess” or surcharge of 10 per cent on sales tax, state excise, entertainment 
tax, stamp duties, agricultural income tax, motor vehicles tax, electricity duties etc. may give 
significant additional revenue which could be devolved to the local bodies for improving the basic 
civic services and for taking up schemes of social and economic development; 
iii) profession tax: article 276 of the Constitution provides for levy of a tax on professions, 
trades, callings or employment for the benefit of the state or local bodies at a rate not exceeding 
Rs.2,500 per taxpayer per year. Many states either do not levy this tax or levy it at very low rates. 
States should levy this tax with a view to supplement the resources of local bodies or they should 
empower the local bodies to levy it.  
Notwithstanding these recommendations, not much seems to have been implemented so far, 
because the state governments pay more attention to the devolution part of the recommendations 
than to the recommendations related to fiscal aspects. Also the local bodies are more interested in 
the devolution package rather than the reforms suggested in the fiscal system owing to their being 
closer to the people who are to be taxed. So that the fiscal effort made by local bodies is very poor; 
                                                                                                                                                                  
various tiers/levels of the rural/urban local bodies at a centralised place where it could be compiled, processed and 
made available for use. In the absence of any reliable financial/budgetary data, no realistic assessment of the needs of 
the panchayats and municipalities for basic civic and developmental functions can be made nor can any information be 
generated on the flow of funds to the local bodies for the implementation of various schemes for economic development 
and social justice.” (Government of India 2000). 
 
  15particularly Gram panchayats do not make any stated efforts to levy taxes that they are empowered 
to levy and collect. Also the performance of urban local bodies, though better than that of Gram 
panchayats, is not satisfactory, as shown in Table 5. 
 
 
4. Fiscal decentralization China versus India 
 
During the 1990s a common trend seen in China and India is the impulse towards fiscal 
decentralization. In the case of China, the 1994 fiscal reform attempted to recentralize the tax 
system and to reform the tax sharing system to place intergovernmental transfers on a more 
systematic footing. The main goals of the reform were to simplify the tax system introducing a 
revenue-sharing system, to raise the revenue to GDP ratio, to raise the central government’s ratio to 
total revenue to increase equalization transfers, and to make the fiscal federal system more stable by 
shifting from negotiated transfers to a rule-based tax assignment. Only the first objective seems to 
have been achieved, while transfers have been inadequate and are not based on expenditure needs, 
and expenditure assignments have not been basically changed since 1994 (Ahmad, Li and 
Richardson 2002). 
Since 1992 India tried to develop a three tier federal system, strengthening the third level of 
government through Constitutional amendments to transform local bodies as units of self-
government. However, the push to decentralize below the state level has been stronger on the center 
side than on the states side, so the process of local government reform is still under way and the 
local governments play a very limited role both in raising revenues and in spending (Rao 2002).  
It seems, therefore, that the two countries are not committed to decentralization.  
As it is well known, the standard economic rational for decentralization rests on efficiency, 
equity and macro-stability grounds
32. In developing countries decentralization is also seen as a 
mean to achieve several goals that government interventions have failed to attain, such as the 
stimulation of economic growth, the reduction of poverty, the reinforcement of democracy, but 
mainly the improvement of service delivery to large populations
33. The theory of fiscal federalism 
set forth in Oates (1972), derived from the classic Musgrave model of public sector responsibility 
for stabilization, distribution and allocation (Musgrave 1959), provides rationale and instructions to 
                                                 
32 A different approach to decentralization is followed by Breton (1996). In his seminal work he argues that the most 
important reason for decentralizing the public sector is that decentralization stimulates intergovernmental competition, 
and when competition breaks down, or produces undesirable outcomes, decentralization fails. On decentralization 
failures see also Breton (2002). 
33 The issues relevant to the question of whether fiscal decentralization generates the positive results that its supporters 
claim is addressed in Tanzi (2002). 
  16assign these functions to different levels of government. Though at the beginning the conventional 
fiscal decentralization theory has been applied in industrialized country, it seems not difficult to 
justify its application in developing and transition countries: while the justifications for 
centralization of the stabilization and distribution functions are relatively straightforward, the issues 
concerning assignment of responsibility for both the expenditure and revenue dimensions of the 
allocation functions are more complicated, due to the potential undermining of a number of 
assumptions underlying public finance theory in general, and fiscal federalism in particular, so that 
the theory has to be adapted.
34 
Among the conditions of a successful decentralization, apart an adequate institutional 
design
35, the followings can be mentioned (Bahl 1999):  
 
•  fiscal decentralization should be viewed as a comprehensive system, characterized by some key 
elements - such as elected local councils, locally appointed chief officers, significant local 
government discretion to raise revenue, significant local government expenditure 
responsibilities, budget autonomy, hard budget constraint, accountability, transparency, 
borrowing powers, freedom from expenditure mandates, unconditional transfers from higher 
levels of government; 
•  finance follows functions, in the sense that first should come the assignment of expenditure 
responsibility to local governments, and then the assignment of revenue responsibility should be 
determined; 
•  there must be a strong central ability to monitor and evaluate decentralization, which implies the 
preparation of a fiscal analysis unit and an extensive data system that allows quantitative 
monitoring and evaluation; 
•  one intergovernmental system does not fit the urban and the rural sector, since sub national 
governments have different capabilities to deliver and finance services and to borrow; 
•  fiscal decentralization requires significant local government taxing powers, which improves the 
accountability of elected officials but implies the correct identification of the sub national tax 
bases; 
•  central government must keep the fiscal decentralization rules that it makes, guaranteeing the 
transfer of power with constitutional changes if necessary; 
                                                 
34 For example, a grater centralization of some functions may be justified on the ground that widespread poverty may 
make preferences more homogeneous across local jurisdictions. For a discussion of these arguments see Smoke (2001) 
and bibliography therein.  
35 Recently it has been underlined the importance of the institutional design: ”decentralization is neither good or bad for 
efficiency, equity, or macroeconomic stability; but rather its effects depend on institution specific design” (Litvack, 
Ahmad and Bird 1998). 
  17•  intergovernmental fiscal arrangements must be simple, which requires the local governments to 
devote fewer resources to administration and the central government to face lower monitoring 
and evaluating costs; 
•  the design of the intergovernmental transfer system should match the objectives of the 
decentralization reform, considering that different kinds of intergovernmental transfers have 
different types of impacts on local government finances; 
•  fiscal decentralization should consider all levels of government, to allow citizen participation at 
a level that insures that voter preferences matter, and to result in accountability of government 
officials; 
•  impose a hard budget constraint, which implies that local governments with fiscal autonomy 
must balance their budget without recourse to year-end assistance from the central government; 
•  recognize that intergovernmental systems are always in transition and plan for this, which 
implies that central governments must have flexibility in their fiscal decentralization plans to 
adjust to changes, for example, in disparities among regions, quality in basic infrastructures and 
technical capacity of local governments; 
•  there must be a champion for fiscal decentralization, that is potential strong supporters that must 
be identified in the people and their elected representatives, the president, the parliament or 
congress, urban local governments and external advisors, such as international organization that 
provide encouragement and some technical assistance for fiscal decentralization. 
 
Trying to evaluate several of the above described guidelines with respect to the Chinese and 
Indian systems, we can observe that both the countries have not followed the advice that fiscal 
decentralization should be viewed as a comprehensive system. The four more relevant dimensions 
of intergovernmental fiscal relations are, as known, the assignment of expenditure responsibilities, 
the assignment of revenue sources, the provision of intergovernmental fiscal transfers and the rules 
governing sub-national borrowing and debt. Till now India seems to have considered 
decentralization mainly in terms of the local election system, without the transfer of all functions 
provided for devolution to local bodies and the assignment to them of the fiscal decision- making 
power. In fact, for not losing power most state governments have been and are still reluctant to give 
up whether significant control over the expenditure budget or part of their tax bases. As underlined 
by the Planning Commission (2002-2007) in its report on urban development, state governments 
continue to take decisions on such matters as rates of user charges, property tax coverage, levy or 
withdrawal of “octroi”, role of  parastatals in water supply and sanitation services, etc., with little 
reference to the urban local bodies that are affected by these decisions. Hence, these decisions do 
  18not always have the effect of strengthening the constitutional role of the elected local bodies that 
often are a subordinate entity under the day-to-day control of the state governments, beholden to the 
state for not only development of the cities but often even for survival (Government of India 2001). 
The situation is even worse for rural local bodies. With regard to China, the 1994 fiscal reform 
greatly changed the national revenue sharing system, gave local governments more control over the 
administration of local taxes but no significant degree of tax autonomy and no substantial 
expenditure assignments. It is true that the central government is expanding the financial capacity of 
local authorities but, notwithstanding  this increased capacity, their budgets still need approval from 
higher levels of government.  
Also the second rule (finance follows function) seems to be neglected in both the countries. 
Relative to the central ability to monitor and evaluate decentralization, in India there is no 
mechanism for collection of data on the revenue and expenditure of the various levels of local 
bodies at a centralized place. The National Development Council
36 meets infrequently and is 
ineffective as a monitoring institution (Rao 2004). In China local governments are the 
administrative organs of the state under the leadership of the State Council and monitoring should 
be easier because local autonomy is of subordinate autonomy, that is lower levels of government 
must complete tasks derived from higher levels of government and what local autonomy they 
exercise can only be within the guidance of those higher levels (Unescap b, n.d.). In fact, the center 
has relatively limited information on local government finance. 
Only India set up a different system of local bodies in rural and urban areas with different 
expenditure responsibilities and financing powers, which means to recognize explicitly the 
differences among local bodies in the capabilities to deliver and finance services. On the contrary, 
China has a unitary fiscal system; the establishment of the taxation separation system in 1994 has 
not been equivalent to the reform of that unitary fiscal system, which requires to hand down part of 
fiscal power to local governments. Currently both the countries have not given local government 
significant taxing powers. 
  In China local governments are based on a hierarchical system with a characteristic of 
leadership at different levels, the lower level being subordinate to higher level, and this feature is 
recognized in the Constitution that, however, has not been changed to recognize to local 
governments the more independent power on fund raising under the existing centralized fiscal 
system. Still, a range of factors contributes to the durability of decentralization, limiting the 
                                                 
36 The National Development Council is presided over by the prime minister and comprised of cabinet ministers, deputy 
chairman and members of the Planning Commission and the chief ministers of the states. 
  19discretion of the central government to attempt a reversal
37. On the contrary, the Indian central 
government amended the Constitution to establish local bodies in rural and urban areas, but it has 
left in the hands of the states the implementation of the decentralization process that till now has not 
been resolutely pursued. It is worth to remember that historically India has had a strong centralized 
system, which may justify the delay to achieve effective federal governance. 
About the design of the intergovernmental transfer system, it has been recognized (Rao, 2004) 
that in India it is necessary to redesign the transfer system to improve accountability, incentives and 
equity
38. The reform of the transfer system must begin with the avoidance of overlapping roles of 
the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission - preferably leaving in the responsibility of 
the Finance Commission the entire transfers, while the Planning Commission should focus on 
physical infrastructure - and must offset both vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances. Also the 
consolidation of the more than 220 centrally sponsored schemes is an urgent need, even though they 
represent only 5 percent of transfers. With regard to China, the fiscal revenue sharing schemes limit 
intergovernmental budget transfers. Nevertheless, the system of earmarked transfers seems to be too 
complex and undersized to fill the gap between the excessive assignment of core expenditure 
responsibilities to lower level governments (counties and townships) and their limited fiscal 
capacity. Moreover, there often is substantial diversion of earmarked funds at sub national levels to 
meet short-term cash outlay requirements. Also equalization grants are undersized and have a very 
poor impact on addressing horizontal fiscal disparities across sub national governments (World 
Bank 2001). The need of revision is clear
39. 
Finally, the rule of hard budget constraint in China is faced by all levels of government and 
sub-national governments are prohibited from borrowing
40. On the contrary, in India in fact sub-
                                                 
37 For example, as a result of the reforms, new, rival power centers have emerged in China. Local governments, 
specially those in areas with the largest growth, now have substantial independent sources of revenue, authority, and 
political support. Moreover, though local officials are still appointed and dismissed by the central government, their 
authority is implied and enhanced by their access to and control of local information and resources. Also the gradual 
decline of the personal authority of national leaders and the rise of local governments has weakened the reach of the 
Chinese Communist Party into the lower levels of government, and many lower government officials now bestow their 
loyalty to localities, not the central government. Finally, as the private market economy has expanded, the ability of the 
central government to monitor and control local economic behavior has weakened enormously (Montinola, Qian, and 
Weingast 1995). 
38 According to Vaillancourt and Bird (2004), India’s complex system appears both to have been significantly 
equalizing and on the whole to have contributed to achieve a degree of cohesiveness in a large and diverse country, 
even if it may be criticized as providing some undesirable incentives with respect to fiscal management of the states. 
39 In recent years, the central authorities started to examine all the earmarked grants and some of them have been 
converted into equalization grants. For example, about RMB 4 billion of subsidies for food in urban areas were 
transferred into the transitory equalization grants in 2001. The same was done with earmarked grants for the 
development of borders regions (Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez 2003).  
40 Before the 1994 reform, budget deficits were financed through a combination of credits from the People’s Bank of 
China and domestic and international borrowing as debt revenues. Since 1995 budgets at all levels of government have 
to be balanced and any violation of the balanced budget approved by the legal process results in administrative 
prosecution against parties directly responsible. In spite of that, the reform’s effectiveness on hardening the budget 
constraint has been undermined by several elements, and often local governments incur soft budgets. The central 
  20national governments face soft budget constraint, mainly because of the vertical fiscal imbalance 
whose size also depends on the possibility to have ex ante budget deficit that creates an incentive to 
increase expenditure and to undermine financial discipline. The consequence is a bail out by the 
higher tier government
41. Sub-national governments have some freedom to borrow but the greater 
share of their borrowing comes from the central government or public financial institutions. 
Despite the differences between the two countries, there are important issues of common 
interest (Rao 2001). The challenges of fiscal decentralization in transitional economies concern, 
among other things, the development of an efficient fiscal system, the replacement of command and 
control system with market based instruments, and the evolvement of responsive intergovernmental 
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  24Table 1 Government layers by countries 
China  23 provinces(°) (Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, 
Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, 
Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, 
Zhejiang),  5 autonomous regions (Guangxi, Nei Mongol, Ningxia, 
Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet)), 4 municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin), and local governments (prefectures, districts, counties, cities, 
towns and villages).  
India  28 states, 7 union territories* (Andaman and Nicobar Islands*, Andhra 
Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chandigarh*, Chhattisgarh, 
Dadra and Nagar Haveli*, Daman and Diu*, Delhi*, Goa, Gujarat, 
Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Lakshadweep*, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orissa, Pondicherry*, Punjab, Rajasthan, 
Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttaranchal, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal), 
and local governments (Nagar Panchayat, municipal councils, municipal 
corporations) 




(°) China considers Taiwan its 23rd province. Hong Kong and Macau are special administrative regions. 
(*) Urban-based forms of local government include: the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA); the 
Municipality, governing urban centres in the provinces; and the City of Pattaya .Rural-based forms of local government 
include: the Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) that constituting local government at a provincial level; the 
Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO), constituting local government at a sub-district level; and The Sukhapiban 
or Sanitary Committee, a local government in a rural centre. 
 
  25Table 2 Comparison of selected items 
 
   1980  1990   1995  1999  2000  2001    2002  
Total population (Million) 








   India  673.0    835.1    931.0  998.0  1,017.0  1,027.0 
b 1,052.0   
Population  rural (Percentage of total) 
   China  80.6    73.6    71.0 69.1 63.8 62.3    ...    
   India  76.9    72.8    73.0  72.0  71.6  72.2 
b 71.0   
Population growth rate (Percent per annum) 
   China  1.2    1.4    1.1  0.8  0.8  0.7    0.7    
      India  2.1    2.1   2.0  1.6  1.8  1.2  2.4    
GDP per capita (US$) (*)
  
   China  206    312    581  788  856  911    966    
      India  257    373   376  437  453  465  471    
External debt (Millions of US$) (**) 
   China  15,828.0 
c  52,545.0     106,590.0    151,830.0    145,730.0    170,110.0     168,538.0   
   India  20,581.0     83,628.0     94,464.0    98,313.0    99,098.0    97,320.0     ...   
Population employed in agriculture (Percentage of population employed) 
   China  75.2    73.7    72.1 68.6 67.9 67.2    66.4    






d ...   




a - end of year.       b - census figures as at 1 March 2001. Data for other years are from the United Nations 
Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision.       c - for 1985.       d - data refer to labour force.        
 (*) Gross domestic product per capita in United States dollars are derived by converting the national currency 
into United States dollars based on the average official exchange rates for the period. The official exchange 
rate might differ significantly from market exchange rates. 
 
(**) Data refer to total debt stocks, defined as the sum of public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt, 








Table 3 Intergovernmental transfers, 1997-2001 
  26    1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
    (In percent of GDP) 
      
Transfers from the central government to local governments  3.8  4.2  5.0  5.2  5.8 
  Revenue  returned  2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6  2.3 
  Fixed subsidy under the old system  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
  General  purpose  grants  0.3 0.3 0.5 0.9  1.4 
  Earmarked  transfers  0.7 1.1 1.7 1.6  2.0 
              
      (In percent of total transfers) 
      
Transfers from the central government to local governments  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
  Revenue  returned  70.5 62.7 53.0 48.9  38.9 
  Fixed subsidy under the old system  3.9  3.4  2.9  2.7  2.0 
 General  purpose  grants  7.5  7.5  10.2  17.9  24.5 
  Earmarked  transfers  18.1 26.4 33.8 30.6  34.6 
              
      
Transfers from local governments to the central government        
  Fixed subsidy under the old system  0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7  0.6 








Table 4 Number of local bodies at different tiers 
 
Rural Local Bodies  Urban Local Bodies 
1. Gram/Village Panchayats                  236,350  1. Municipal Corporations                          109 
2. Panchayats Samities                              6,795  2. Municipalities                                       1,432 
3. Zilla Panchayats                                        531  3. Nagar Panchayats                                 2,182 
4. Autonomous District Councils                       9   
Total                                                       237,824  Total                                                          3,723 













  27Table 5 Revenue and expenditure of local bodies (rural and urban) in percent of total 
 
A) All India Revenue and Expenditure of Panchayati Raj Institutions (All Tiers) 
 
  1998-99  1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 
Revenue         
Own Tax                                 3.64   3.04  3.24   3.61   3.87 
Own Non-Tax                         3.08  2.95  2.86   2.77   2.98 
Assignment + Devolution       30.19  29.23  28.10  27.46  27.69 
Grants-in –Aid                        56.34  58.92  57.76  58.85  58.95 
Others   6.75    5.85   8.04    7.31    6.51 
Total Revenue                       100.00        100.00        100.00       100.00        100.00 
         
Expenditure         
Revenue  Expenditure  71.18  73.25  75.36 75.92 73.05 
Capital Expenditure                28.82  26.75  24.64  24.08  26.95 
Total Expenditure     100.00        100.00        100.00       100.00        100.00 
Own Revenue as % of  
Revenue Expenditure 






B) All India Revenue and Expenditure of Urban Local Bodies (All Levels) 
  
Revenue         
Own Tax                                 41.30  39.10  38.53  38.85  39.23 
Own Non-Tax                         18.39  16.92  18.12  18.97  19.21 
Assignment + Devolution       19.18  20.09  20.45  18.12  17.69 
Grants-in –Aid                        15.70  17.09  15.36  17.64  16.48 
Others    5.43    6.80    7.54    6.42    7.39 
Total Revenue                          100.00       100.00        100.00 100.00 100.00 
         
Expenditure         
Revenue  Expenditure  75.28  73.97  74.10 76.69 76.24 
Capital Expenditure                24.72  26.03  25.90  23.31  23.76 
Total Expenditure       100.00      100.00        100.00        100.00        100.00 
Own Revenue as % of  
Revenue Expenditure 
75.87  69.03  70.81 71.78 68.97 
Source Own calculations based on the Report of the 12
th Finance Commission (2005-2010) 
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